標(biāo)題: NT的密碼究竟放在哪 [打印本頁] 作者: 雜七雜八 時間: 2011-1-12 21:01 標(biāo)題: NT的密碼究竟放在哪 根據(jù)以前的發(fā)現(xiàn),windowsNT密碼雖然不象Windows95那樣以簡單加密形式包含在一個文件里面,而是一些雜亂的暗碼,分別藏在7個不同的地方。這篇最新發(fā)表的文章告訴我們WindowsNT密碼隱藏的第八個地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100/ ]/ }3 \5 m; ?
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From: Patrick CHAMBET <pchambet@club-internet.fr>/ w# C( ?* p9 V6 S3 d8 l4 A
( e4 i' t) |1 y7 gTo: sans@clark.net 8 k8 }; V0 ?. x5 Z/ I I3 BSubject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords c% y9 Y# ^6 `' z' `/ y* f# c* x8 aHi all,; {# q( H$ c. }* V+ i
We knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across2 ^8 k( g7 U2 p3 g
the system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.6 f' R) r; n Q7 p& }
IIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can / r2 X1 {. G* p0 ~- e' l1 f! \be compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives, ) K. a6 W K( q! CKeys and Values. It is stored in the following file:/ P ^# o* a2 ~9 L
C:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin & k& _5 u+ j/ n- G' eThe IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords:- A) M& N; d b& r( ]" l) P* W( P
- IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the$ C: t4 y. ~/ |$ f
MMC)$ M8 V1 V' j6 C% I( {
- IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !)/ l- g, r- W7 b: p
- UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of 7 \" n6 ~" l. Pyour virtual directories is located there. $ i7 S/ X$ D/ I% }, _* n4 n- The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called - c4 p" c: u9 ~/ V! m6 @. a"HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database). 0 m5 m6 q: Y. Z9 W* ^" gNote that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are : a3 c F8 P1 @srambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM! c+ C2 K; M+ k* J8 b
have permissions on this file.9 ?1 _ E' V m
BUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print! D7 Z& w( g1 G, K% n" w
these passwords in CLEAR TEXT. % b: }/ K( l) k% }2 l9 xThe user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a ) d/ A4 N2 T3 Emalicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server.0 N/ W5 S& k+ U
Obviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow) u2 C9 t5 R8 K/ i1 p6 _
logons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the # u+ r" }0 {, X: o2 g) zproblem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered:7 R$ a4 d: m' H
" b) V% _7 r' J* B$ `. n$ o- U; Y; G( yIIS 4.0 Metabase 4 G3 B% h' R: o& M1 w+ C6 l* U?Patrick Chambet 1998 - pchambet@club-internet.fr 0 W, l: s7 f& t--- UNC User ---% n }+ e1 b" C. y1 s7 r
UNC User name: 'Lou' : X) ]) [ U/ w# k, e; }UNC User password: 'Microsoft'0 \& ^4 c' f: f. q1 {& `0 ]) Z
UNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False'' u9 W$ M: L, Z9 q
--- Anonymous User ---. }* t! e& O4 j4 l6 Y: N" o* ?& ~
Anonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER' ' O+ v+ Z4 b5 i9 t) c; lAnonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp'; p3 Z8 I: r ~5 B2 } p2 U
Password synchronization: 'False' 7 ~; _- X( H- V+ ~--- IIS Logs DSN User --- + ~+ ^7 |! g; }8 E# zODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG' ! N- ?, ~$ p( b. Q' `ODBC table name: 'InternetLog' v8 L- [1 J* d9 S% o( D1 R
ODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin' : h# i: n( D6 v3 Y2 f6 m" y$ i& pODBC User password: 'xxxxxx'( J& b' r6 ~9 V {3 J2 ^
--- Web Applications User ---, k% m6 v+ w- _7 M8 A& c
WAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER' / E2 v* A6 b! _WAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2'/ ~1 [' a5 x; Z
Default Logon Domain: ''; x' W, o+ x$ s# S, U5 ^& t; z
"! s+ d. D2 F% z$ d
For example, you can imagine the following scenario: - r, M b, N A, q0 r# Q# bA user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say # g7 _' d6 O( v6 X+ @4 Jserver (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example5 k3 E2 A1 R" }) ^2 K6 c
an IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts % a: v! i3 H, ?" Nthe login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual' [+ l0 b: W: k% e/ u% Q, U
directory located on another server, say (b)./ ^0 F% ^% M7 o" x q) v. Q
Now, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b)., w; C9 ~+ j) t; q: k G; e" b5 H
And so forth...& k, Y5 ], H' G! S+ ]% l
Microsoft was informed of this vulnerability. % v! I, T$ F. H3 ~' @& s' e_______________________________________________________________________ & h% f0 ]- c8 t- ~6 H3 ^; f9 g2 c+ bPatrick CHAMBET - pchambet@club-internet.fr5 x* b/ E6 i- h+ R; z
MCP NT 4.0 7 d! c. I8 j$ _Internet, Security and Microsoft solutions$ d2 M) V, w7 ^7 S7 k2 E" u
e-business Services 3 [. c7 n2 v- |5 G: @IBM Global Services _3 u: S5 }7 Q% W9 F+ m% f6 _