NT的密碼究竟放在哪

根據(jù)以前的發(fā)現(xiàn),windowsNT密碼雖然不象Windows95那樣以簡(jiǎn)單加密形式包含在一個(gè)文件里面,而是一些雜亂的暗碼,分別藏在7個(gè)不同的地方。這篇最新發(fā)表的文章告訴我們WindowsNT密碼隱藏的第八個(gè)地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100

7 J7 ~& S/ A; i, L. l; t" QFrom: Patrick CHAMBET <pchambet@club-internet.fr>
  a2 U0 w- O+ _$ o
! V) t  p4 ~& C6 S6 STo: sans@clark.net
" ?3 d8 n0 w! W4 D: M: u, Z1 PSubject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords
* J* `+ {, @' r8 L) S: Z* M6 OHi all,
We knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across
the system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.
7 Z5 I& M4 F0 x' A% pIIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can
be compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives,
- a8 u: G' i( b" rKeys and Values. It is stored in the following file:
C:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin
The IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords:
& F0 I; |/ H, d/ u- o- IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the
! u0 j0 A& Y% _0 s9 C) {4 _MMC)
2 q  |# O0 L' r# J- IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !)
- UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of
: A! |; J. I$ \your virtual directories is located there.
- The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called
" u9 e2 t2 G9 ^) o5 g8 _7 K8 {5 `4 C"HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database).
Note that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are
srambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM
have permissions on this file.
BUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print
9 m  F1 I  T6 k! _  v6 y/ k* ^; }. rthese passwords in CLEAR TEXT.
The user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a
malicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server.
; `# S: X& ^7 X) K6 iObviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow
logons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the
# O! ^, M9 r4 e8 g9 tproblem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered:
$ ?' Y. q0 x/ y( w, v"
IIS 4.0 Metabase
?Patrick Chambet 1998 - pchambet@club-internet.fr
--- UNC User ---
6 E- h  V/ A; JUNC User name: 'Lou'
UNC User password: 'Microsoft'
UNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False'
" K* I2 f2 I1 S# r8 u  o! `--- Anonymous User ---
) L( b% z7 {# r4 b) c9 R, JAnonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER'
. [* x% h4 v0 B  x& V( hAnonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp'
Password synchronization: 'False'
--- IIS Logs DSN User ---
0 k, `9 P0 i" q: z: t7 iODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG'
ODBC table name: 'InternetLog'
ODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin'
ODBC User password: 'xxxxxx'
6 [2 x/ Q& y# y4 K--- Web Applications User ---
WAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER'
  @/ ~, x+ X, G" t) VWAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2'
2 j0 }- q( n7 f2 N; UDefault Logon Domain: ''
"
For example, you can imagine the following scenario:
A user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say
server (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example
& a# M& n5 N" van IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts
the login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual
, v1 N% x& _- u' e& F3 k  l: Cdirectory located on another server, say (b).
2 H8 D$ z3 ?: MNow, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b).
, t7 r3 L( Z5 U  q& mAnd so forth...
Microsoft was informed of this vulnerability.
9 D( P) g9 j4 f7 f( b. u* \6 o_______________________________________________________________________
Patrick CHAMBET - pchambet@club-internet.fr
MCP NT 4.0
3 k1 k+ ~" \" s  [1 |3 I( JInternet, Security and Microsoft solutions
( `0 G9 C/ I2 ^) j8 He-business Services
IBM Global Services