NT的密碼究竟放在哪

根據(jù)以前的發(fā)現(xiàn),windowsNT密碼雖然不象Windows95那樣以簡(jiǎn)單加密形式包含在一個(gè)文件里面,而是一些雜亂的暗碼,分別藏在7個(gè)不同的地方。這篇最新發(fā)表的文章告訴我們WindowsNT密碼隱藏的第八個(gè)地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100
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2 o6 \, t8 k& ?9 I( H& F" mFrom: Patrick CHAMBET <pchambet@club-internet.fr>
9 y4 k4 O4 Y9 \4 L: e! U
To: sans@clark.net
Subject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords
Hi all,
We knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across
, H' W( ~3 N5 Nthe system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.
& V; B7 S: r" |! y3 [" Q- OIIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can
/ P+ N" [1 l  ~9 j4 xbe compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives,
Keys and Values. It is stored in the following file:
C:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin
- o( G* e7 f  t- s* B% tThe IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords:
# s5 h5 v7 I% M  Z' K* D- IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the
% S4 B$ h- {4 V: d- }MMC)
- IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !)
- UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of
your virtual directories is located there.
- The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called
"HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database).
Note that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are
srambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM
have permissions on this file.
BUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print
! X) q0 h8 O2 {these passwords in CLEAR TEXT.
The user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a
malicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server.
Obviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow
( a2 Z/ u$ _! d: A  W7 K( klogons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the
problem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered:
  K! x/ x8 G, f9 C2 Z) g* ?9 ?"
: _# Q7 U4 q  CIIS 4.0 Metabase
?Patrick Chambet 1998 - pchambet@club-internet.fr
) K! F, v% E; T9 P9 p* x# D--- UNC User ---
UNC User name: 'Lou'
2 I8 M4 P9 D% K* r4 k% k: qUNC User password: 'Microsoft'
- \1 k0 f7 l: b+ {UNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False'
* A# W( y* E8 h/ \) V# Z& k3 i--- Anonymous User ---
7 J% b) r- S" W! V3 u% H$ VAnonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER'
  [, z' ?' `$ R( Q3 S2 e) f# S  zAnonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp'
Password synchronization: 'False'
--- IIS Logs DSN User ---
! _# W1 V2 S# }( ]( Q, U  IODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG'
ODBC table name: 'InternetLog'
1 h+ X, V  A* p. p8 k$ |ODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin'
ODBC User password: 'xxxxxx'
--- Web Applications User ---
WAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER'
WAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2'
4 f* e! d: g! I; f6 x; }Default Logon Domain: ''
"
For example, you can imagine the following scenario:
A user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say
server (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example
an IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts
* ]: ~9 v5 I* O- T0 l* y9 Kthe login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual
directory located on another server, say (b).
Now, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b).
  w, w, \: p6 _+ D! X# P7 kAnd so forth...
, C& X/ a$ X% O* oMicrosoft was informed of this vulnerability.
: M* b8 a) p5 \0 g; M! T_______________________________________________________________________
# v7 @& q5 W- o( U) J7 yPatrick CHAMBET - pchambet@club-internet.fr
MCP NT 4.0
Internet, Security and Microsoft solutions
* m; z) {0 b, }- Z. N0 se-business Services
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