NT的密碼究竟放在哪

根據(jù)以前的發(fā)現(xiàn),windowsNT密碼雖然不象Windows95那樣以簡(jiǎn)單加密形式包含在一個(gè)文件里面,而是一些雜亂的暗碼,分別藏在7個(gè)不同的地方。這篇最新發(fā)表的文章告訴我們WindowsNT密碼隱藏的第八個(gè)地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100
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0 S( J& |9 ]& ZFrom: Patrick CHAMBET <pchambet@club-internet.fr>
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To: sans@clark.net
Subject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords
Hi all,
& m  x" ~: X% X! pWe knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across
the system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.
IIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can
be compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives,
Keys and Values. It is stored in the following file:
C:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin
7 G) N9 q; X: h5 P$ w+ p6 t% l1 p2 |5 e, @The IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords:
- c  N  T/ R/ Y3 _- IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the
+ h3 X+ ?8 x6 lMMC)
- IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !)
- UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of
" l" s+ J3 B8 G# @. S  myour virtual directories is located there.
- The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called
9 u: s2 ~" S0 X, C5 @& p0 |( g"HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database).
) q+ D; K" r% J. ?. B4 z  jNote that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are
6 ]8 J* H$ b. c6 e0 D# i; Qsrambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM
have permissions on this file.
BUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print
these passwords in CLEAR TEXT.
8 ^+ }: w" F/ Q- R8 n5 RThe user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a
malicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server.
Obviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow
' [2 j6 C1 h, a/ @logons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the
8 M, B( j3 a; [problem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered:
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IIS 4.0 Metabase
?Patrick Chambet 1998 - pchambet@club-internet.fr
--- UNC User ---
UNC User name: 'Lou'
UNC User password: 'Microsoft'
+ u# K* S, f: w: C7 A2 E% s4 TUNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False'
--- Anonymous User ---
Anonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER'
Anonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp'
+ \# R4 s- V9 R. z- gPassword synchronization: 'False'
* J: \. K: D+ f! H--- IIS Logs DSN User ---
% q8 a2 n- ?8 i4 @' m$ T0 N" q0 SODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG'
ODBC table name: 'InternetLog'
6 p$ c$ R* R( S- t+ lODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin'
ODBC User password: 'xxxxxx'
--- Web Applications User ---
0 v9 A! Q. J! M0 Y- r% X& JWAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER'
1 U2 h& ?! J9 a5 P* `* }WAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2'
Default Logon Domain: ''
"
% k9 Q" E1 [% B9 K. y) ]For example, you can imagine the following scenario:
2 P5 M, R* v- p2 k9 PA user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say
: t8 p3 D, n! V* M& a$ r1 Zserver (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example
an IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts
the login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual
. h* v, z" L0 d3 u5 O' y+ H" q; |# Z$ Adirectory located on another server, say (b).
Now, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b).
And so forth...
Microsoft was informed of this vulnerability.
2 a/ t# [' s% v% ]  U_______________________________________________________________________
Patrick CHAMBET - pchambet@club-internet.fr
MCP NT 4.0
3 c/ V% R) V; ?5 ~. [7 cInternet, Security and Microsoft solutions
e-business Services
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